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The Property Tax in the Slovak Republic: Major Reforms
and Striking Results
By Phillip J. Bryson, PhD
This article is based on a presentation given on August 24, 2005, at the International Property
Tax Institute’s 8th International Conference on Property Tax in Transition held in Prague,
Czech Republic.

W

hen the communist era ended
with the Velvet Revolution in 1989,
Czechoslovakia embarked on a program
of transition to a market democracy.
Public sector foundations featured the
creation of local government finance and
intergovernmental fiscal arrangements,
including limited use of local user fees.
After institutions were established on
the basis of legislation, the two countries
agreed in 1993 to go separate ways in what
came to be called the Velvet Divorce. The
division opened the way for the pursuit of
divergent fiscal practices, but for the first
decade of the separation, there were no
fiscal changes to signal movement into
new, divergent directions.
Efforts to establish genuine fiscal
decentralization were not impressive
in either country before talk of accession to the European Union began. As
that happened, both republics became
committed to adopt “reforms of public administration” and to move from
two levels of governance—central and
municipal—to four. They prepared to
submit themselves to governance from

Brussels and also to add a regional level
of government to share the burdens of
subnational public service provision.
Legislation provided for the necessary
institutional changes in both countries,
but it was in Slovakia that the reform
of public administration was seen as a
complement to, rather than a substitute
for, fiscal decentralization.
This article reports on recent Slovak efforts to pursue these institutional changes.
First, it will review the early characteristics
of Slovak fiscal decentralization focusing
on the property tax as the most important
source of locally generated revenues.
Next will be a discussion of the divergent
developments in the fiscal systems of the
two republics despite their similar fiscal
decentralization programs. The reforms
of public administration pursued in the
early 2000s is the next topic; here, too,
some of the implications of the widely discussed Slovak introduction of the “single
tax” along with other changes that were
part of a new fiscal system implemented at
the beginning of 2005. The final section
offers some concluding observations.

Philip J. Bryson, PhD, is the Douglas and Effie Driggs Professor of Economics in the Marriott School of Management at Brigham Young University. He earned his PhD in economics
from Ohio State University.
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Fiscal Decentralization in the
Early Slovak Transition
The Republic of Slovakia has a population of 5.364 million in an area of 49,012
square kilometers. The Slovak population
density approximates that of Portugal,
Hungary, and France, with significantly
more space for the average Slovak than
that available for the average Czech. Slovakia has 109 citizens per square kilometer
of territory to the Czech Republic’s 131.
This compares to 228 citizens per square
kilometer for Germany, 105 in France, 28
in the United States, and 32 for Europe
as a whole. (Štatistický úrad Slovenskej
republiky 1997).
Slovakia was a part of federal Czechoslovakia from 1918 to 1993. After the
end of WWII, democracy faltered and
the federation continued as a Soviettype Socialist Republic. With the end
of the Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact,
and the Council for Mutual Economic
Assistance (CMEA), both the Czechs
and the Slovaks have been in transition
to democratic, market systems. Reestablishing local autonomy and utilizing the
property tax as a fundamental revenue
source to finance municipal services are
potentially vital elements of this transition. An effective property tax must be
based upon the market value of property,
since the market is a non-arbitrary reflection of the incomes and the preferences
that determine property values.
A property tax system based on market
real estate values is just now becoming
a reality in Slovakia. For economic and
political reasons, a normally functioning
real estate market, like the new market system generally, has been developing only
gradually. Legacies of the socialist era and
constraints on the privatization of property have not been the only roadblocks.
Early in the transition, the Slovak central
government preferred to ignore local selfgovernment, postponing the dramatic
progress that was to emerge later.
Nevertheless, transition reform efforts
launched after the Velvet Revolution
were rather successful. In 1992, without
20

any formal consultation of the Slovak
people, political leaders unilaterally decided to abandon the federation. Slovak
leaders rejected any partnership with the
Czechs, along with the Czech preference
for a rapid transition to a market orientation. Both before and after the opening
of the reform era, the Slovaks were
substantially less comfortable with departure from the order and security of the
Soviet ways than were the Czechs. This
philosophical difference was evident in
a provision of the new Slovak constitution which “establishes the possibility to
stop...the process of privatization and/or
restrict business activities and to reverse
various measures that already had been
taken in this respect.” (Valko 1997, 76)
As one would expect, however, the
Slovak self-government and fiscal systems continued for a time to resemble
those developed jointly with the Czechs
late in the Czechoslovakian era. In the
aftermath of the Velvet Revolution, both
republics encouraged municipalities to
seek independence from some of the
forced amalgamations of the previous
era. Under socialist rule, local autonomy
had largely been lost. From 1950 until
1989, decisions about the quality and
type of public services were made by
central governments in Prague and
Bratislava. Regional governments existed
during this period only to administrate
and facilitate the policies of the central
government. Local government activity
was also limited almost exclusively to
such “state administration” activities.
It should be remembered that the
economic transition of these countries
followed hard on the heels of an era
in which centralism had been rather
absolute. Funding decisions had been
based on political and party influence
and evinced no close relationship to the
citizenry’s needs or demands for public
services, especially in the area of capital
expenditures. Many local services were
provided by the central government, e.g.,
police, public utilities, fire protection,
and education. Socialist systems also
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provided a number of services western
governments do not, including housing,
which was produced and managed by the
central government just as medical care
was. Still, permitting local governments
to function largely symbolically actually
ran counter to Slovak tradition.
When the transition era began in 1989,
local governments increased in strength
and number. There are currently 2,781
of them and only a few have a population in excess of 50,000. The majority
of Slovak municipalities have fewer than
500 inhabitants and many have less than
100. Comparing the number of cities per
10,000 inhabitants in nine Central and
Eastern European countries reveals that
Slovakia (like only the Czech Republic)
has significantly more cities than other
countries in the region (see table 1).
Of these neighboring countries, only
Hungary’s cities and towns compare in
number to those of the former Czechoslovakia. The diminutive size of Slovak and
Czech municipalities raises the question
of whether they have sufficient personnel
and resources to administer local government effectively. About 125 of the cities
in the republic have created the position
of City Manager to assist Slovak elected
officials in their management functions.
Several supportive organizations have as-

sisted in the development of a professional
core of local public managers. There is
also an organization of city finance directors whose operations are similar to those
of the Government Finance Officers Association in the United States.
Theses groups offer regular training and
professional development. They strive to
influence policy relative to intergovernmental financial relationships and local
service provision. The existence and activities of these types of groups appear to have
been positively influenced by the former
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) mission in Bratislava, which
assisted in establishing local administrative
infrastructure in Slovakia and in training
managers of local governments.
In Bratislava, the Association of Cities
and Towns of Slovakia (Združenie Miest A
Obci Slovenska [ZMOS]) represents local
governments in their interaction with
the central government. This association
is similar to those of numerous other
countries. It participates in drafting and
reviewing legislation on local government administration and policy and has
also organized a foundation to train city
employees to perform local government
functions. ZMOS has more than 2,700
members and thus represents over 95%
of Slovakia’s municipalities.

Table 1. Number of subnational government units in selected transition economies

Country

Type of
Government

Number
Of Units

Country
Population

Municipalities
per 10,000

Albania

Municipality

356

3,400,000

1.05

Bulgaria

Municipality

255

8,900,000

.29

Czech Republic

Municipality

6234

10,300,000

6.05

Hungary

Municipality

3148

10,006,000

3.06

Poland

Municipality

2459

38,400,000

.64

Romania

Municipality

2948

22,700,000

1.30

Russia

Municipality

2000

149,000,000

.13

Slovakia

Municipality

2781

5,300,000

5.25

Ukraine

Municipality

619

52,100,000

.12

Source: Calculated from Bird, Ebel, and Wallich (1995). Czech and Slovak data from incountry sources.
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Decentralization Difficulties and the
Property Tax in Transition Countries
Overcoming the legacies of central planning has proven to be a difficult and slow
process (Bryson and Cornia 2004). To
say that local governments have often remained underfunded is a euphemism, at
best. Having no significant sources of independent funding, municipalities have
had to wait for transfers and grants from
central governments too often gripped
with fiscal crises of their own. Central
governments have generally been unwilling to abandon the centralist traditions
of the previous era, which implies a
policy preference for indirect and nontransparent taxes and for public services
which provoke no substantive political
opposition. Citizens of the localities have
been disinclined to pay for public service
provision; they have preferred funding
through transfers from the center rather
than from local taxation. Central governments have been willing to make what
transfers they could, but retained control
over the programs funded.
As the transition began, the citizens
of transitional countries were not always
opposed to foregoing generous public
goods provision, since they anticipated a
larger and more readily available assortment of private goods they perceived to
be common in market economies. Thus,
they silently accepted the willingness of
their local governments not to pursue any
substantial efforts to charge fees or impose property taxes that would produce
an independent source of revenues. As a
result, local officials were not forced to
confront their constituencies with taxes
to fund badly needed services.
When Czechoslovakia began to decentralize its fiscal system in 1990, legislation
established more Western-style institutions. The government borrowed heavily
from Western Europe, adopting taxes
prevalent there without reference to
whether such a system was optimal for
transition countries, or whether that
system could generate revenues sufficient for their needs. Since the end
22

of communism, fiscal crises have been
common in the transitioning countries
and transfers of funds from the center
have been insufficient to cover needs.
Municipalities have been unable to enjoy
genuine autonomy, especially because
they lacked sufficient sources of independent revenue that a number of countries
raise through the property tax.
That tax, potentially the most important source of local revenues, remained
strictly the nominal tax it had been under central planning. In the transition
period, the four most important revenue
sources for the Slovak Republic were the
familiar VAT, the personal income tax,
corporate income tax, and an income tax
on unincorporated businesses. Although
all of these were collected by the central
government, only VAT revenues were not
shared with local governments.
This system was based on identical legislation to that enacted in Czechoslovakia
before the Velvet Divorce. After the Velvet
Divorce, institutional inertia and preoccupation with other problems kept either
republic from making substantive changes
in the fiscal system for some time. Ostensibly, pre-accession motivation provided
by the European Union convinced the
Slovaks to launch the recent, bold reforms.
But before that time, the differences between the two fiscal systems were not always
great. The Slovak fiscal system was inclined
less toward centralization than its Czech
counterpart, although both countries
emphasized a desire to achieve decentralization and to develop self-government
(samospravy) for their municipalities.
Property Tax Rate and Base
Property tax policy is established by the
central government and national legislation, but the day-to-day administration of
the property tax is largely the domain of
Slovak municipalities. This contrasts with
the Czech system in which the central
government collects the property tax
and redistributes the revenues to the
municipalities.
The taxation of land was based on the

Journal of Property Tax Assessment & Administration • Volume 3, Issue 2

area of each individual parcel; similarly,
the taxation of buildings was based on the
number of square meters of a structure’s
floor space, including the land area under
the buildings. The tax rate was established
separately for the two kinds of properties.
In the property tax formula, adjustments
were made for the location of land and
buildings and for the particular utilization
of the taxed unit. These modest, largely
symbolic efforts to account for market
characteristics were a genuflection to
market valuation.
Of the eleven Slovak classifications
of land, eight adjusted the assessed tax
value for the quality of the land, which
was estimated by the Ministry of Agriculture. The data collected on quality
and potential productivity were remarkably detailed. Parcels in close proximity
sometimes had substantial differences in
estimated productivity.
In the transitional property tax system,
basic tax rates ranging from one Slovak
crown (SKK) to ten Slovak crowns per
square meter (adjustable annually) were
applied to six classes of buildings ranging from residential to industrial. The
basic rate increased by .75 SKK for each
floor. The tax on buildings allowed for
two additional adjustments:
• Data on the size and type of a
building could be multiplied by
a population-based coefficient,
with that for the largest cities
being greater than that for the
smallest towns by a factor of 4.5.
• The local administrator could
apply a final coefficient to the
formula evaluating a building’s
location within the city. This
could increase or reduce the
tax bill by as much as 50%, giving city administrators a modest
degree of flexibility in taxing for
differential location qualities.
Data on per capita land and building
taxes under the transitional system (see
figure 1) revealed a pattern of significant
revenue generation in Slovak municipalities. With increasing municipal size, per

capita revenues from the tax on land
declined continuously, although not
monotonically. For the tax on buildings, the opposite held: as municipality
size increased, per capita tax revenues
increased continuously. In larger cities,
the tax burden was shifted more to structures. The implications were:
• because land is a resource that
cannot be removed from the
region to avoid the tax, the land
tax is underutilized in Slovak
cities, keeping badly needed
revenues below their potential.
Moreover,
• although there is an intent that
these taxes be borne by business, a selling point to local
inhabitants, the tax burden will
ultimately be shifted to consumers in any case, unless the tax
has lump-sum rather than excise
characteristics.
The property tax law of the Slovak
Republic granted explicit exemptions
for state-owned, cultural, religious, and
other such properties. An exempt owner
of commercial real estate was taxed
at a rate of about one-third of that for
commercial organizations. In the larger
cities, exemptions have represented
a substantial portion of the potential
property-tax base, severely limiting the
revenue capacity of the tax system.
Implementing a tax system with capacity
to generate sufficient revenues for public services and other exigencies, then
undermining the program with exemptions, is clearly self-defeating.
In pursuit of a presumed objective to
promote private housing construction,
explicit, 15-year exemptions were granted for newly constructed and recently
renovated homes. Since the property
tax base and rates of the transitional
system did not produce a large yield, the
incentive effect of this policy had little
actual significance. Buildings restituted
to former owners were also relieved of
property taxes for a 15-year period.
In the transitional system, local govern-
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ments were responsible for the collection
of property tax data and the tax itself.
They relied on the centrally operated
cadastre for information pertaining, for
example, to the ownership of properties. Specific information on land areas
was available from the cadastre, but that
agency was of limited help in identifying
land. Since it does not record information
on building size, it could provide no assistance in assessing the tax on buildings.
In the Slovak property tax system, the
municipality/taxpayer relationship has
been fraught with asymmetric information. Information laws have prevented
the municipalities from verifying important data through the cadastre,
rendering them dependent upon taxpayers to supply the details about their
taxable land and buildings. Despite this
problem, the finance ministry has not
publicized any concerns about property
tax compliance. Restructuring the fiscal
system to increase property tax yields in
a substantial manner, however, is likely
to produce a compliance problem. It
should be no surprise, therefore, that
changes in property tax laws in the new

era are proceeding gradually.
One expects with an area-based tax that
there will be a close relationship between
the area of a plot or of a building and
the tax revenues either would generate.
Interestingly, this is not the case in Slovakia (Bryson and Cornia 2001). Certain
classes of land are taxed far more heavily
than others; building plots in all Slovakian
cities produce more revenue per square
meter than arable land or forests. The
same holds for taxes on improvements.
Industrial and commercial buildings produce much greater revenues per square
meter than agricultural or apartment
buildings. Apparently, the heaviest tax
burden was on commercial and industrial
activities, or on capital. Smaller towns and
cities were inclined to tax building plots
more heavily than arable land. Probably
seen as less productive of revenues than
farmland, forests were subject to even less
tax than the former.
The ratio for arable land is around 1.25
for towns and cities smaller than Bratislava, where the ratio is considerably lower
at 0.14. In the transition property tax system, the smaller towns had a tendency to

Figure 1. Per capita land tax and building tax by size of municipality, 1996
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put the burden of tax revenues on buildings rather than on land. Commercial
and industrial buildings were burdened
with consistently higher taxes than buildings for other uses. Apartments and
agricultural buildings provided services
and products viewed in the communist
era as necessaries, so they were subject to
whatever subsidization would keep their
prices very low. There was, therefore,
a central planning legacy of minimal
taxation for these items. By contrast,
industrial and commercial activities and
properties were a targeted source of revenue, a tradition that continued into the
transition. It should be noted, finally, that
the property tax’s relatively greater importance to municipalities was structured
so that the ratio of tax to square meter of
building space increased monotonically
and significantly as the municipal tax
jurisdiction became smaller.
This fairly extensive review of the property tax system of the transition era has
been designed to demonstrate the significance of the changes introduced at the
beginning of 2005 with the New System.
The Property Tax and Municipal
Budgets in the Transition
If fiscal decentralization is to succeed,
local governments must have access to
an autonomous source of tax revenue,
rather than be dependent upon the
central government for all revenues
(Bird, Ebel, and Wallich 1995). The
visibility of spending choices made by
local public officials, both elected and
appointed, generally exceeds that of
national officials. The accountability
of such officials logically increases with
that visibility (Litvak, Bird, and Ahmand
1998), and makes a strong case for local
governance and local tax.
The property tax embodies many positive characteristics that recommend it as a
local tax. Since taxpayers cannot evade it
by engaging in transactions beyond a relevant political border, it is immobile. Since
its imposition does not cause changes in
the utilization of the services of taxed

properties, it is potentially neutral. Since it
provides fairly constant revenue yields regardless of the state of the business cycle,
it is stable. Since relevant taxpayers are
homeowners and property holders, they
are more likely to have the means and
the ability to pay the property tax. This
is in contrast to the highly popular, yet
regressive, excise taxes, which represent a
larger proportion of lower than of higher
incomes. Further, if local public services
improve and enhance property values, it
is appropriate that the beneficiaries are
required to pay for the increased value.
Finally, as a direct tax, it is highly visible to
taxpayers (Musgrave 1993; Oates 1996).
That visibility is a two-edged sword, of
course. Since they are direct and visible,
property taxes make citizens and officials
less comfortable than indirect taxes
(Youngman and Malme 1994). Generally, both officials and citizens prefer
excise taxes and local fees on a variety of
transactions (Shleifer and Vishny 1998).
Too frequently local officials feel the heat
of political problems the property tax
can provoke (Paugam, 1999).
Implementing the property tax provides both administrative and practical
problems:
• For transition countries, it is
difficult to establish the marketoriented property values the tax
suggests, since there is typically
no functioning real estate market in countries beginning the
recovery from central planning
(Bertaud and Renaud 1994).
• Inflation can erode assessments,
which are not automatically
linked to inflation or economic
growth.
• Cadastral data can be of low
quality and impair collection
and enforcement efforts.
• The uneven distribution of
the property tax base creates
inequalities (Netzer 1966).
Fiscal decentralization can succeed
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only if the following three conditions
hold. First, there must be a correspondence between the expenditure
responsibilities of local governments and
the availability of financial resources.
Second, incentives must be provided for
subnational governments to mobilize
their potential resources in their pursuit
of autonomy. Third, the provision of
transfers from the central government
must be transparent and based on objective and consistent criteria rather than
negotiation and ad hoc bargaining (Bird,
Ebel, and Wallich 1995, 59).
It becomes apparent that the implementation of an effective property tax
regime requires close attention to institutions of governance. In countries where
time and good judgment have permitted
these institutions to develop properly,
the rewards of political autonomy have
been achieved for local governments.
Moral Hazard Problems in Property
Tax Administration
Principal/agent conflicts can be expected when the “ownership” (in terms of
policy prerogatives rather than revenue
receipts) and the administration of the
property tax are shared by central and
subnational governments. Conflicts arising from the lack of clear ownership are
common in transition countries, largely
owing to the very divergent perspectives
and incentives of local and central governments. Moral hazard problems arise
when agents pursue their own interests
rather than those of the principal. In
Slovakia, the property tax is the design
of national policy, but it is collected by
the municipalities themselves. There is
no malingering in the collection effort
of the local governments, since the revenues are badly needed.
The significance of these institutional
arrangements is apparent when compared to the Czech system, in which local
government is the principal and central
government acts as the agent. The center
both designs policy and collects the tax,
so that the local government principal
26

can receive such property tax revenues
as the central agent’s collection efforts
provide. Not being in a position to monitor the collection effort, revenue-hungry
subnational governments can only hope
that the national government will exert
significant effort.
The data show that revenue from these
taxes is suboptimal since the center lacks
incentive to exert the effort and resources required to increase the revenue
yield. Smaller property tax revenues can,
however, be easily offset by greater transfers from other taxes or revenue sources.
This is certainly the case in the Czech
Republic, where relative to other transition countries, the central government
has been anything but a poor provider.
The Finance Ministry would also argue
that local governments do not attempt
to achieve optimal receipts, since they
set their property tax coefficients such
that their receipts are only about half
what they could be (Ministry of Finance
of the Slovak Republic 2005).
It is also a form of moral hazard when
local government officials, acting as
(insufficiently monitored) agents for
the citizenry, the true “principal” in a
democracy, fail to exert an honest effort to produce the revenues required
for the public services citizens demand.
Once municipalities become financially
dependent on the central government,
they become quite willing to avoid
full financial responsibility by silently
partnering in their principal/agent arrangements. They become comfortable
in permitting the center to take all the responsibility for raising municipal funds,
thus avoiding any potential political heat
a serious property tax might generate. It
is easier to conform to central guidelines,
mandates, and directives than to take a
stand for local preferences that clearly
differ from those of the center in a less
bureaucratic and centralized system.
Still considering the Czech case, if the
center compensates for its lack of effort
in property tax collection by providing
revenues from other sources—even if lo-
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cal governments are financially no worse
off, these alternative revenues often come
with “strings attached.” Other moral
hazard issues emerge with central government revenue transfers. For example,
if the distribution of resources is badly
skewed across subnational governments,
or if subsidies encourage local governments to pursue activities of high priority
to the center, their fiscal redistribution
becomes very appealing (Musgrave 1961).
But transfers from the center can merely
offset revenues that could have been
raised locally. If the central government
compensates the municipality for the
property tax funds it has failed to collect,
local officials can act less transparently.
Because the Slovak central government
was initially far less generous in providing transfers, Slovak municipalities had
to take advantage of their opportunity to
collect property tax revenues for themselves. From the 1960s until the end of
central planning, local governments in
the Czechoslovak federation derived
roughly 60% of their total receipts from
subsidies. From around 1984, however,
central government subsidies began to
decline. This trend extended into the
transition to market economics and
democracy. By the mid-1990s, subsidies
represented no more than 25% of the
total receipts of Czech and Slovak municipalities (Pekova 1996).
The data for the transition period reveal the relevance of these moral hazard
considerations. They are reviewed comprehensively for the period of transitional
finance in the two republics from the end
of central planning to 2000 by Bryson and
Cornia (2004). They reveal Slovakia’s municipalities to be substantially poorer than
those of the Czech Republic. After the
Velvet Divorce in 1993, Czech municipal
budgets were more than twice as large as
those of Slovakia. This was at least partly
a result of per capita differences in grants
from the respective central governments.
By the end of the period, per capita public
services expenditures for Czech citizens
were three times greater than those for

their Slovak counterparts. Local budgets
in Slovakia were only about 14% of the
total national budget, while those of the
Czech Republic ranged from 25% to just
over 33% of the national budget.
The difference in municipal grants
shows why Slovak municipalities were
comparatively quite poor. Grants in
Slovakia ranged from 1.5 billion Slovak
crowns (SKK) in 1993 to 1.1 billion SKK
in 1994. The grants paid by the Czech
central government to the municipalities
ranged from just over 27 billion Czech
crowns (CZK) in 1993 to 59.5 billion CZK
in 1996. (One should keep in mind that
the population of the Czech Republic is
twice as large as that of Slovakia, but also
that the Czech crown will purchase from
1.25 to 1.3 Slovak crowns.) Interestingly,
in the years just prior to Slovak independence (1991 and 1992), the government
in Prague provided grants of 7.9 billion
and 2.4 billion crowns respectively for
Slovak municipalities. Thus, independence from the Czechs turned out to be
a financial shock for municipalities in the
Slovak Republic, for it separated them
from the Czech central budget. In that
period, Slovak municipalities also found
that politics would separate them from
the Slovak central budget. Then prime
minister Vladimir Mec̆iar, preoccupied
with what the political opposition termed
the “family privatization” of Slovak industry, had no interest in helping solve
the financial problems of Slovak towns,
cities, and regions. Mec̆iar’s autocratic
leadership style and his lack of interest
in municipal development was a clear signal that they could expect no significant
transfers or grants from Bratislava.
Since they had far less substantial financial support from the central government,
Slovak municipalities were much more
diligent in their efforts to harvest property tax yields and thus the property tax
represented a significantly larger share of
the total revenues of local governments.
Using data from the finance ministries of
both republics, Bryson and Cornia (2004)
calculated that for the years 1993 to 2001,
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the real estate tax in Slovakia provided
from roughly 11% to 18% of the revenue
for municipal budgets (table 2). On average, property tax revenue represented
about a 15% share of total receipts for
Slovak municipalities. In the Czech Republic, with larger municipal budgets, the
real estate tax ranged from 3.28% of total
municipal revenues up to a maximum
of 4.8%. Although Czech property tax
revenues were relatively small in 1993,
the trend thereafter was toward smaller
receipts. The Slovak municipalities clearly
demonstrated greater effort in collecting
the property tax.
Table 3 illustrates the disparity between
the share of total national budget receipts
enjoyed by municipalities in the Slovak Republic and the Czech Republic. Whereas
the Czech municipalities received a share
of around 30% of total governmental
receipts, Slovak municipalities received
only around 6%. Given their financially
less comfortable circumstances, it is
little wonder that Slovak municipalities
attempted more diligently to harvest
greater property tax revenues.
Both republics struggled in the transition era with periodic fiscal crises, the
result of which was often a reduction in
municipal revenues. The Czech government was good about avoiding unfunded
mandates, but it retained strong influence
over the use of centrally provided funds,
thus inhibiting local autonomy. The Slovak
municipalities had little to work with, but
seemed to exhibit more independence
with what revenues they did receive.

The New Post-Transitional Fiscal
System in Slovakia
Foundations of the New System were laid
in Slovakia in the period preceding accession to EU membership in May 2004. The
emphasis of the EU during that stage was
not on fiscal decentralization for the two
republics, but on a related action, i.e., the
reform of public administration.
In marked contrast to the Slovak case,
the Czech Republic was interested in a
honing of organizational arrangements,
seen most graphically in the creation of
the new regional level of government.
The goal of the reforms was to modernize central administration and provide
“territorial public administration” to
improve the quality of the public sector’s
products as a whole (Bureš et al 2002,
8). Regional governments are ostensibly to “bring state administration to the
people” (priblížit státní správu obcanum),
involving rank-and-file citizens in subnational governance processes. But the
question whether the reform of public
administration could effectively serve as
a substitute for municipal autonomy, i.e.,
for fiscal decentralization, has not yet
been adequately addressed.
While pursuing the mechanics of such
organizational questions, the Czech
finance ministry and political apparatus
were developing a social welfare state.
That implied more generous provision
of the expansive kinds of entitlements
provided in most of Western Europe, especially pensions and health care. In doing
so, the central government began to run
large budget deficits and accumulate a

Table 2. Real estate tax as percentage of municipal budget revenues

Slovak Republic
Czech Republic

1993
10.45
4.80

1994
13.81
4.74

1995 1996
12.57 14.73
4.01 3.93

1997
15.60
3.60

1998
16.97
3.43

1999
18.81
3.42

2000
17.89
3.28

2001
16.00
3.68

2000
6.19
31.98

2001
6.95
26.26

Source: Bryson and Cornia (2004)
Table 3. Local budgets as a percentage share of the national budget

Slovak Republic
Czech Republic

1993
5.89
25.45

1994
6.82
28.78

1995 1996
6.46 7.70
30.35 35.29

1997
7.61
29.79

1998
6.91
30.34

1999
5.67
30.16

Source: Bryson and Cornia (2004)
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growing burden of debt. It has long since
recognized the impossibility of an indefinite expansion of public expectations and
commitments. It is now desperately seeking ways to increase national revenues,
but the reality of the macroeconomic situation is that it will be necessary to reduce
expenditures in the next few years. This
essential focus on the national budget has
removed the focus of the finance ministry
and the political system from the municipal situation and the process of fiscal
decentralization (Ministry of Finance of
the Czech Republic 2005).
Interestingly, pre-reform Slovakia paralleled the Czech case in that samosprava
(local self-government) was performed
by elected municipal officials. In a separate office, local “state administration”
activities and programs were performed
by agents of the central government.
An inference as to the resources committed by central government to local
state administration can be made from
employment figures. Before the reform
of public administration in 2000, state
administration employed 287,817 Slovak
citizens. That represented 84.7% of total
government employment. Only 52,100
were employed in self-government at the
local level, which was only 15.3% of total
government employment. After implementation of the reforms, employment in
state administration declined from nearly
85% to 37%, while the number employed
in local self-government increased from
approximately 15% to 63% (Nižňanský
and Kling 2002, 252). In 2001, the total
expenditures of local offices of state administration were 58 billion SKK. Local
governments in that same year spent only
30.6 billion SKK. So direct spending by
the central government for the municipalities was nearly twice as much as the
independent municipal governments
spent. It was high time for a reform of
this unthinkable centralization, although
to Slovakia’s central authorities “state
administration” represented little more
than the state’s solution to the problem
of very small municipalities unable to

provide for their own management.
The conception and design of the
Slovak reform was introduced early by
an official paper (Government Office
of the Slovak Republic 2000) listing the
functions that would continue to be
performed by local state administration
officials after the reform. These centralgovernment responsibilities included
local police services, criminal investigation, military administration, the state
veterinary office, the state hygienist office,
the environmental office, the cadastral
office, the land and forest office, the labor and social services office, and the tax
office. This is an imposing list of activities
for which Slovak municipalities will have
neither responsibility nor managerial prerogatives. As explained earlier, the Slovak
municipality, within its fairly narrow range
of ceded responsibilities, received little
funding but rather liberal managerial
authority throughout the transition era.
The Slovak national government intended for this situation to change and
the reforms have been bringing about
the desired change in a striking manner.
Reforms are also moving the municipalities toward substantive change. The
Slovaks recognize what this process
requires and that a reorganization or
reform of institutions cannot be an effective substitute for fiscal decentralization.
Effective governmental organization and
fiscal decentralization are policy complements rather than substitutes. The Slovak
central government conceded (Government Office of the Slovak Republic 2000,
4) that decentralization of public affairs
must include “decentralization of functional responsibilities, decentralization
of finances, decentralization of political
power…” The complex process of decentralization is only effective “if it is
implemented in all three dimensions at
the same time.”
But while they were reforming, the
Slovaks wanted more than marginal organizational change. They considered their
economic future imaginatively and were
prepared for additional adjustments,
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although Slovak economic development
throughout the transition period had often been surprisingly strong. Among the
struggling transition states, the Slovak
Republic has been stronger in relative
terms than one would have supposed,
especially considering its political situation through the Mec̆iar era.
The initial economic successes Slovakia experienced in its independence
era were due in large measure to a
mini-boom in exports. Prosperity and
expansion in Western markets provided
demand, and the shift was made successfully from the old CMEA markets to the
important EU markets. Sensible monetary policy kept inflation within bounds
and although development was spotty,
leaving some regional unemployment
levels high, progress was fairly steady.
So, the introduction of reforms around
2000 brought some striking new policies, including the institution of a “flat
tax” (Kňako 2002). This tax featured a
common rate of 19% for corporate and
personal income tax, as well as for the
VAT. Details of the New System were
spelled out in a document published by
the Ministry of Finance (2004a).
The principal objectives of the tax
reform were to achieve fairness and simplicity while eliminating double taxation.
One should keep in mind that the fiscal
reforms were only a part of the overall
reform effort being pursued during this
period. Nižňanský and Pilat (2002) cogently present the entire transition era
as a pursuit of multi-front reform. Public
administration reform alone comprised
four processes: changing the territorial arrangement, reforming extant institutions
and creating new regions, decentralizing
public finance powers and competencies,
and modernizing the system’s legislative framework and management. From
the perspective of this article, the New
System’s ramifications for local finance
are of particular importance.
Among the many considerations motivating the reform at the local level, it
was significant for Slovak policymakers
30

that the share of revenues from property
taxes were considerably lower than in numerous countries in either the European
Union or the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD).
As a result, the ministry intended to
strengthen the property tax as a part
of the package of changes designed to
promote the process of fiscal decentralization. Following is a discussion of some
of the main changes announced by the
Ministry of Finance (2004b) that went
into effect on January 1, 2005.
Before the reforms, central government had announced their allocation
of transferred tax revenues to the municipalities each year in the State Budget
Act. This process was “unstable” and did
not permit the cities and towns to engage
in effective planning until after the announcement had been made. The New
System was designed to stabilize the flow
of revenues to local governments and
give them an opportunity to engage in
multiple-year financial planning.
The finance ministry announced that
the personal income tax was to become
an “own” source of revenues for both
regions and municipalities. Of the total
revenue from this tax, municipalities
were henceforth to receive 70.3% and
the regions 23.5%. Only 6.2% of the revenue was to remain a part of the national
budget (Ministry of Finance of the Slovak
Republic 2004a, 31). The general notion
was that roughly one-third of municipal
revenues would now come from the
personal income tax transfers, one-third
would come from grants from the central
government and the European Union,
and one-third would come from municipal own revenues, i.e., from the property
tax, local user fees, and from privatization
of publicly-owned assets (ZMOS 2005).
Local governments received the right
on January 1, 2005, to set “tax rates” (a
term applied, interestingly, not only to the
real estate tax, but apparently also to the
very limited number of user fees already
extant) and to introduce new “taxes.” The
municipalities also received full discre-
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tion to apply exemptions according to
their own preferences. Potentially more
important was that municipalities were
also given policy control over the property
tax. In the first place, they were to use the
funds they raised through the property
tax, like those transferred to them from
the personal income tax, autonomously;
the state denied itself any right to specify
the uses to which these revenues could be
put. Moreover, all the old laws pertaining
to the coefficients applied to property
classifications under property tax administration were now null and void. The
municipalities could use the property tax
independently. The real estate tax, along
with the charitable donation deduction
and the inheritance tax, were eliminated
as a part of the tax reform (Zachar 2004,
38). The objective of the new legislation
on real estate tax was to create a legal basis for transparent taxation of real estate
based on market valuation.
It should be observed that in the short
time since the inception of the New System, the property tax has not become
a more important source of revenue.
There have been no plans to increase
revenues from this source in budgets to
2007 (ZMOS 2005). Early in the year of
inception, it appeared that municipal
self-government had gained by these new
developments. At the same time, resources seemed no less scarce at the municipal
level. As the new rules came into effect,
the larger cities felt that they gained less
through the change than some of the
smaller ones, but institutional change
in resource allocation often produces
winners and losers, requiring some modifications or institutional accommodation
to the changed system.
The Government of the Slovak Republic (2002, 2) made its own statement of
policy intent promising to protect the
interests of taxpayers. It promised it would
increase the tax revenues of municipalities
and define the tax revenues of regions in
such a way as to assure that the tax burden
on individual taxpayers and businesses
would not be increased. This was to be

accomplished by the creation of a special
law “containing the definition and structure of tax revenues for municipalities
and higher territorial units and criteria
for their redistribution to municipalities
and higher territorial units’ budgets.”
This intended assurance does little for
the proponent of fiscal decentralization,
since that concept seems threatened
when central government defines tax
structures for subnational governments
and for redistributing revenues.
Later in the same document, the Government of the Slovak Republic (2002,
4) addressed the issue of the developing
real estate market, the values of which
would replace the old coefficient system.
It said, “Depending on how realistic real
estate prices become, which is a basis
for the taxation of property transfers,
the Government will revise the current
property tax rates and adopt corresponding solutions to unify them.” What the
government defines as realistic or what
actions it would take in the absence of realistic prices is not stated. However, given
past traditions, the policy course would
likely involve regulatory activities. This
appears to further contradict the current
stated policy of letting municipalities
work out their own property tax rates.
The perception of the Ministry of Finance (2004b, 33) was that the reform
of public administration and the changes
connected with the accession of Slovakia
to the European Union were the driving
forces behind the creation of the new,
comprehensive legislative framework
developing the budgetary process in
the sector of public administration. The
finance ministry documents evince a far
less distinct tone of centralism.

A Tentative Assessment of
Reform Effects
The New System as applied to local
governments has been in the implementation phase for too brief a time to
say how effective it will be, although it is
clear that the effect will depend both on
the macro impacts of the new tax system
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on the national budget and the ability of
the subnational governments to leverage
their new policy maneuverability into
enhanced tax revenues.
Since the initiation of the new tax
system at the national level late in 2003,
Slovakia’s economic performance has
appeared to improve. The Republic’s
recent growth rates were strong at 5.5%
in 2004, finishing the year at 5.8% for the
final quarter of the year (Slovensko.com
2005). Growth was expected to be somewhat less in 2005, but it was sufficiently
strong, coming during a period of low
growth throughout Europe generally, to
cause widespread notice and discussion of
Slovakia’s improved macroeconomic situation. The International Monetary Fund
(2005) and Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (2004)
found Slovakia’s strongly increased output expansion commendable and noted
that the country’s fiscal and external imbalances had diminished considerably in
recent years. The increased transparency
and greater incentive compatibilities usually attributed to the reforms have helped
improve the business climate and attract
foreign direct investments. Real Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) expanded by
4.5% despite a contraction in domestic
demand in 2003. But increased activity in
the domestic sector and accommodating
macroeconomic policies permitted real
GDP growth estimated at 5.25% for 2004.
Further progress is still badly needed;
employment gains have been uneven
across sectors over the period described,
and unemployment at 17.75% remains
very high.
The World Bank (2004) agreed with
this assessment, but observed the need
for the Slovak Republic
• to achieve fiscal consolidation
supportive of appropriate public finance management;
• to complete ongoing reforms
in health, pensions, and public
finance;
• to develop income levels con32

vergent with those of Europe by
achieving trade competitiveness
in EU and world markets; and
• to reduce poverty and unemployment, partially a function
of the marginalization of the
Roma ethnic group and the
east-west development gap in
the country.
In the long term, these achievements
may be feasible if Slovakia can continue
its currently strong economic performance. Data from the Statistical Office
confirm the recently strong growth, but
it is interesting to put it into temporal
context. Table 4 indicates quarterly
GDP for 2003 and 2004; table 5 provides
greater temporal perspective by showing
annual GDP growth from 1993 to 2004
in both current and constant prices, the
latter removing the inflationary bias to
provide an indication of real growth
rates per annum, as indicated in the last
column of the table.
These numbers show the recent,
positive economic performance, but
they do not demonstrate that growth is
a response to the stimulus provided by
Slovakia’s recent New System of national
and local finance, or more specifically
that they are a response to tax reductions. Since economic growth had been
strong in the early transition period
to about 1999, the return to over 4%
growth in 2002 could be interpreted
simply as some kind of economic recovery. Although European economies
were largely stagnating in these slower
years and there was a general slowdown
in the U.S. economy in 1999 through
early 2002, exacerbated by the terrorist
attacks of September 2001, it is not likely
that the slowdown in Slovakia following
initially strong transition performance
was simply cyclical. Such an explanation,
however, might explain why Slovakia, in
an economic environment influenced
by the stagnation of some important EU
players, likewise entered into a slower
growth phase. It does not explain why a
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simple recovery beginning in 2000 and
2001 restored the Slovak Republic to
its previously high growth rates without
changing the stagnant environment responsible for the slowdown. That leaves
it necessary to consider seriously the
notion that growth over the past two or
three years was a function of economic
stimulus arising from reduced taxes and
increased direct foriegn investment in
Slovakia.
Crediting the New System with ending
the period of sluggish growth, however,
does not explain what it was that made
Slovakia perform well in the earlier transition period under the old fiscal system.
Such an explanation might lean on
Slovakia‘s reaping the benefits of a successful shift from CMEA markets to what
would become EU markets in the early
transition period along with positive economic conditions and expectations in
the region during the early transition
period. These things were followed by
a boom in the U.S. economy and the
stimulus that phenomenon provided the
world economy in the late 1990s.
But the concern here is less with the
macro performance of the Slovak economy in this period than with the budget
performance. It is of interest to the present study that the growth in the overall
economy has not yet translated into
higher budget receipts for the government at any level. From the perspective of
the Slovak government, the rationale for

the New System would have to be that the
elimination of some taxes and the reduction in tax levels should provide growth
stimulus sufficient to offset the reductions.
This has not yet occurred, however.
The third column of table 6 shows accumulated revenues as received monthly,
while accumulated expenditures are
shown in column four. A simple calculation of the growth of budget receipts and
budget expenditures yields results that
are interesting to compare with GDP or
general economic growth. To make the
measurements comparable, the data are
taken in current prices.
Government revenues from 2003 to
2004 grew at the rate of only 4.01%, while
GDP grew at the rate of 10.35%, again in
current prices. (Without an adjustment
to constant prices, growth would be overstated proportionately for the general
economy as well as for budget receipts
and expenditures in the period in question, since some of the growth would be
attributable simply to price increases.) So
budget receipts did not grow as rapidly
as the economy as a whole, reducing the
advantage of the rapid economic growth
from the perspective of the public sector. It is important to note, as the Slovak
Republic currently struggles with national
deficits and debt, that policymakers managed to make the growth in expenditures
Table 5. Slovakia GDP growth, 1993-2004
(Constant Prices, 1995=100)

Table 4. Slovakia GDP, 2003, 2004

2003
1Q
2Q
3Q
4Q
Year

(Mill SKK)
272,980
300,801
309,682
317,733
1,201,19

2004
1Q
2Q
3Q
4Q
Year

(Mill SKK)
308,722
330,367
336,791
349,606
1,325,486

Source: Štatistický úrad Slovenskej
republiky (2005a)

1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004

Current P’s
411,366
495,649
576,502
638,449
712,679
781,437
844,108
934,079
1,009,839
1,098,658
1,201,196
1,325,486

Constant P’s
Year
512,849
544,674
576,502
611,935
640,151
667,107
676,919
690,697
716,845
749,937
783,406
826,493

Growth over
previous yr.
6.20
5.84
6.15
4.61
4.21
1.47
2.04
3.79
4.62
4.46
5.50

Source: Štatistický úrad Slovenskej
republiky (2005a) and own calculations
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(8.21%) more in line with the increased
GDP growth, although it was still a little
less than the growth of the economy.
Whether this rate of growth of expenditures seems justified or appropriate, it still
contributed to deficits and debt, since it
exceeded the more modest 4.01% growth
rate of revenues.

Concluding Observations
The strong macro beginnings enjoyed by
the Slovak Republic did not secure fiscal
well-being for the local governments.
The unusual politics of that era left
municipalities in a position that made
them work very hard to generate all the
local revenue they could, which was done
mostly through energetic collection of
property tax revenues; the imposition
Table 6. Republic of Slovakia: Budget and
GDP growth, 2003-2005
(Millions SKK, Current Prices)

Year
2003
2003
2003
2003
2003
2003
2003
2003
2003
2003
2003
2003
2004
2004
2004
2004
2004
2004
2004
2004
2004
2004
2004
2004
2005
2005
2005

Mo Σ Revenues
1
22,300
2
31,800
3
46,400
4
67,008
5
79,100
6
100,900
7
127,700
8
147,100
9
163,400
10
186,800
11
203,600
12
233,100
1
21,031
2
36,394
3
66,945
4
98,132
5
109,176
6
120,695
7
139,126
8
153,715
9
172,840
10
195,858
11
213,675
12
242,444
1
24,644
2
39,789
3
65,0463

Σ Expenditures
24,000
44,800
64,200
91,600
109,600
128,600
158,800
180,200
201,100
227,200
246,400
289,000
23,689
40,818
65,770
92,409
111,446
133,150
157,677
178,501
202,262
226,386
247,753
312,732
20,334
40,897
62,246

Source: Štatistický úrad Slovenskej republiky (2005b)
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of centrally-specified, local user fees;
and the privatization of state-owned assets transferred to municipalities at the
outset of the transition period.
The development of reforms of public
administration, undertaken in the period prior to Slovakia’s accession to the
European Union, included the adoption
of the New System of national and local
finance that caught widespread attention
because of the elimination or reduction
of many of the country’s taxes, both national and local, and the adoption of a
common rate or “flat tax” of 19%.
It was hoped that the New System would
provide encouragement for investment
(both domestic and foreign) and stimulate economic growth. The economic
growth rate did increase substantively,
which was unusual given the sluggish
conditions prevailing in most of Europe at
the time. One might observe that Slovakia
had enjoyed relatively strong growth in the
early years of the transition and postulate
that the growth of the past two or three
years was just a return to that normal level
of performance. But that explains neither
why the original growth rates were not
maintained nor why they were resumed.
It seems reasonable, as was suggested in
the previous section, that the original
growth period ended with the incentive incompatibilities of the old finance system,
the loss of early transition momentum,
and the lack of dynamism in Europe in
general. Growth momentum was regained
when reforms were given renewed vigor
early in the present decade.
It is not helpful to paint a picture more
beautiful than the reality it intends to
portray. The recent local government
provisions of the New System are bold and
consistent with the changes made at the
national level. They do, in fact, provide
municipalities with greater opportunities
to find their own way financially, which
will enhance their political autonomy.
The fact remains that the local governments remain fiscally challenged. As the
state assigned the lion’s share of personal
income tax receipts to local governments,
it simultaneously transferred the responsi-
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bility to them to fund a large proportion
of the education programs previously
funded nationally. But greater opportunities were also provided for the subnational
governments (regions had been added to
territorial samosprava) to act with greater
autonomy in the financial realm. The state
will not permit municipalities to expand
local property tax efforts in a manner
that will increase the overall burden of
Slovakia’s taxpayers, but municipalities
do have opportunities to function much
more independently. One continues to
hope that more autonomous subnational
governments will ultimately be the key
to substantial increases in the revenuegenerating capacity of the subnational
governments of Slovakia.

Policy statement of the government of the
Slovak Republic, Public Finance Reform.
November. http://www.vlada.gov.sk/
dokumenty/programove_vyhlasenie_
vlady-20021104_eng.rtf.
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